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. . . . The 195th meeting of the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD convened at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, 21 December 1972, with the following present:

Mr. Harry B. Fisher, Chairman  
 [redacted] DDP Member  
 [redacted] DDI Alternate Member  
 [redacted] DDS&T Member  
 [redacted] DDS Member  
 [redacted] Legal Adviser  
 [redacted] Technical Adviser  
 [redacted] Executive Secretary  
 [redacted] Recording Secretary

25X1A

Guests:

[redacted], Deputy Director of Security (IOS) - In his own case only.  
 Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security -  
 In the case of [redacted]  
 [redacted] - In his own case only.

25X1A

25X1A

MR. FISHER: We have the case of [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] And if I might say on [redacted] - and I want you all to know that I have no objection to your jumping in with questions of your own - but the main thing, to me, throughout this case is: But what did YOU do? He mentions lots of sensitive projects, but from really almost personal experience, as well as I understand it, he was the supervisor pretty far up the line. And certainly my questions will be geared to: Okay, you were Chief, Technical Branch, 1959 to 1961. You received credit for the inspections you did abroad. He mentions positive operations. I'd like to hear about what he did in positive operations. And maybe he has some time there -- but he is looking for some 27 months.

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He speaks of getting the engineer ready for [redacted]

But what did HE do about it? Overseas liaison. To the extent he went overseas to meet these people, he got credit for it. We don't normally give credit for liaison in this country.

He then speaks about a one year project detecting

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[redacted] I don't know whether this was

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hazardous. But we will hear him out on it.

He was on this BoB Committee for security of the White House and Presidency. You know, in my opinion his case is really worse than that of [REDACTED]

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He speaks of [REDACTED]

25X1

but I'm afraid the monitoring is really a few spaces removed from actually doing it. He does make a pitch at the end that although it was a supervisory relationship he "case officered" these things, and I'd like to know what he means by that and by "operational matters other than in a supervisory position."

Then [REDACTED] again his personal involvement

25X1A

in that.

And finally, from 1969 to date he speaks of handling

25X1A

[REDACTED] And I have the feeling that he personally didn't do any of these --

25X1A

[REDACTED]: He says he "was involved in" - and I think we have to know what his involvement was.

MR. FISHER: Now I know a bit how he feels. He is

[REDACTED] relationship -- but I have the feeling that if we gave it to him we would have to give it to [REDACTED] and Howard Osborn, and Bob Wattles, and Jack Coffey, and right on up the line. Maybe I'm wrong. But we will hear him out.

25X1A

25X1A

He speaks of the [REDACTED] I really don't

25X1C

know what he is talking about or what he did. He was the contact with two assets [REDACTED] I don't know whether he did it under cover, or if they knew who he was -- what the circumstances surrounding that are. The training and documentation of an agent going overseas. Again, what

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did HE do? And finally, involvement in recruiting this female asset --  
I just don't have a feel for it.

Naturally both [ ] feel pretty 25X1A  
strongly about getting into the CIARDS. In the case of [ ] he's a 25X1A  
lawyer and he was certainly honest enough to tell me that he was planning  
to practice law [ ] It also gives me a slight twinge when he 25X1A  
says - "And I will have 25 years of service and therefore, at the age of 46,  
I'm entitled to retirement" -- which of course he isn't. Nevertheless,  
he feels that Security being in a surplus situation and being subjected now to  
a further cut, that maybe he could be surplused out. It hurts me, because  
I feel that Security probably would like to get rid of some of these senior  
people who are blocking progress, but if he doesn't get into this System he  
can't do anything for four more years, and that's a major [ ] change in his  
planning, so he is fighting pretty hard. 25X1A

[ ] Unless he is surplused. *under Civil Service*  
MR. FISHER: Not at age 46. He has to be 50 even to be 25X1A  
surplused, to get an annuity. [ ] could go out as surplus if  
we can apply it to Security in the months ahead of us, and he wouldn't have  
to take a cut. So Art's stake is not as great. And he is past 55, so  
there's no further reduction -- he would just lose the three and three-quarters  
percent he would get if he were in CIARDS.

Do you feel there's any discussion you would like to  
have before we bring him in?

[ ] Although he isn't eligible for optional 25X1A  
retirement yet, is he?

MR. FISHER: Oh no, he's a long way from that. He has  
only 23 years and 11 months of Federal service. 25X1A

[ ] He will be 60 before he has his 30 years.  
[ ] In this Agency-- Yes, you're right. 25X1A

[ ] made quite a point of one of our antecedent  
cases he ~~Approved For Release 2002/08/26 : CIA-RDP78-03092A001100100002-4~~ Now

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I've forgotten which one--

MR. FISHER: One was a 1969 case-- And [ ] 25X1A  
gets pretty legalistic. He's saying: You made that decision, you have  
to stay with it -- you can't go back and forth. On the other hand, we  
have this other man who [ ] came in and talked to, who we turned 25X1A  
down, who did much the same thing - contractual security. Do you  
recall [ ] his name, Murray? 25X1A

[ ]

MR. FISHER: It may have been.

Is Mr. Osborn outside waiting to come in?

[ ] said he would send them 25X1A  
both on up right at ten after 2:00.

MR. FISHER: I'm trying to think - do we want to take  
them together? Are they coming in together? 25X1A

[ ] Yes.

MR. FISHER: I hate to ask Howard Osborn to wait outside, 25X1A  
but I'd really like to get [ ] in first and then be able to discuss what  
he says with Osborn afterwards. Don't you feel we should see [ ] 25X1A  
first? 25X1A

[ ] Yes.

. . . [ ] then joined the 25X1A  
meeting at the invitation of the Board . . .

MR. FISHER: Art, you have been through this quite a  
few times in other cases, so you know generally what we are driving at.  
I'd just like to get [ ] it for the record that you know that the sensitivity  
of a project - the sensitivity of the work you're involved in is not as  
significant as your personal involvement, and again, either [ ] hazard

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or stringent tradecraft to protect your own cover. I think this is where we have some trouble in relating the supervisory role <sup>once or</sup> ~~ones~~ twice removed from the actual operation, versus your involvement.

Along that line it is interesting that the Director - Mr. Helms - was considered by a special panel of Larry Houston and myself and he wasn't put into the CIARDS. I mean, Helms actually asked us to think about it. And he tended to agree with us. All I'm saying is that obviously he is responsible for everything the Agency is doing, but he personally agreed that on balance he was not qualified under the rules.

25X1A

[ ] He doesn't have any overseas, does he?

MR. FISHER: A lot of TDY but that was all.

But again, the overseas time is good. What we are talking about is the non-overseas time, and that has to be good --

25X1A

[ ] Is it just basically the super<sup>visory</sup> part of it that concerns you?

MR. FISHER: Well, let's run through it. You speak in 1959 and 1961 of being Chief, Technical Branch, and that you did inspections abroad. Well, obviously, the inspections abroad you have been given

~~credit~~ credit for. I don't know - do you feel that you are also entitled to credit [ ]

25X1A

25X1A

[ ] I do, and also many of the things that we were involved in at that time-- Those were rather hectic days. As you perhaps know - or many of you know - when I came in in 1959 we had a small group of relatively non-professional people, and then because of [ ] and a few things like this, we built rather rapidly. Actually we got 22 more slots - all engineering slots, and began to look into the threat, and found, of course, they were a lot more ~~sophisticated~~ sophisticated, I think, than we believed. ~~Certain~~ Certain things like - you remember

25X1A

the old [ ] [ ] And as we found these things out

25X1A

25X1A

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everybody got more and more concerned. The DDP got more concerned about the threat -- the higher level got more concerned about the threat. We dashed wildly around trying to really build a capability. In fact, as you recall, I was trying like mad to hire engineers, and even went out myself on some of them. Meanwhile the demands kept [REDACTED] building up, and we didn't have the men. Me - I'm a lawyer - I knew nothing about electronics, so I had to get a grasp on that, mostly to know what was going on, and also to make sure the engineers weren't giving me a snow job of some kind.

I did - I worked directly with the DDP on many things concerning the threat - their concern. I arranged things - briefings, training, liaison type - conducted liaison myself. And when I needed something for [REDACTED] or something, I went out with the team.

MR. FISHER: What do you mean, you went out with the team?

25X1A [REDACTED] I conducted a [REDACTED] with them.

25X1A MR. FISHER: Where?

25X1A [REDACTED] Generally around in the Washington area.

Now this doesn't count in the overseas part of it --

25X1A MR. FISHER: You mean you went out to our own installations?

25X1A [REDACTED] Right.

MR. FISHER: You see, Art, we are going to have a lot of questions of this same nature. Nobody questions the difficulty of the job, or the significance of the target you were shooting against. What we are trying to get at is - was it hazardous? or did you have to practice stringent security and tradecraft? That is really the heart of it.

You take Commo, there were a lot of engineers who

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25X1A sort of developed [ ] equipment which was used overseas, but that didn't give them qualifying service. It's a personal type of thing--

25X1A [ ] Well, I know one of the things that probably bothers you is the supervisory thing. I think you have to recognize that in the Agency there are many supervisory jobs where you can't just sit back and be a supervisor, you actually have to become deeply involved yourself -- you have to be the case officer on it. Many of these things I mentioned along the way, that was exactly it.

25X1A MR. FISHER: First let me go on here.

So on the [ ] again we all -- I certainly was there with you --

25X1A [ ] The other part is that [ ] we had the positive responsibility for the Washington area, and back in the old days

25X1A [ ] as I indicated, many of them were of interest to Mr. McCone.

MR. FISHER: I'd like to go on down the list here.

25X1A On the [ ] I think we have heard you on that.

Then you did go on to the positive side of it --

25X1A [ ] Harry, before we leave the [ ] 25X1A

I think it might be well to draw a distinction between the type of [ ] 25X1A

25X1A

MR. FISHER: You're not normally doing a [ ] 25X1A

25X1A under those conditions. [ ] is protecting our own-- I think we understand that.

25X1A [ ]: I think if any [ ] were done 25X1A where you had to operate under covert circumstances, that that is the thing we would be more interested in.

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MR. FISHER: Yes, that was my next question.

You then speak of working directly on a number of

[ ] As you said, you are not a technician. 25X1A  
What would your participation have been?

[ ] I would help the men so far as wiring 25X1A  
and this and that-- I know enough about that--

MR. FISHER: Could you give us a for instance? 25X1A

[ ] When I'm speaking of these positive  
things, many of them were under what you would say would be controlled  
situations. Many of them were in [ ] Headquarters Building. Some of  
them were outside [ ] this type of thing. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Well, Art, are you saying you went out  
to [ ] where you made -- 25X1A  
[ ] 25X1A

[ ] In some instances. I'm not saying that  
it was extensive. Generally speaking the men would go.

I was pretty tied up in an extensive installation we  
had for Mr. McCone here.

MR. FISHER: You mean that is protective, though?

[ ] It was of a positive nature. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Well, are you reluctant to discuss it? 25X1A

[ ] No, I'm not reluctant to discuss it. 25X1A  
But McCone was quite a one for making sure that [ ]  
regardless of where they were - here or home. And he was pretty  
fussy about it, let's put it that way. It was this type of thing.

MR. FISHER: You then speak of case officering the 25X1C  
covert assignment of an Agency technical security engineer [ ]

[ ] Again, what was your personal involvement in this? 25X1A

[ ] Just about what I say-- And here again 25X1A  
I'm trying to distinguish it from the supervisory things. And actually  
it's basically that - I case officered it, between making the arrangements

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with the Division, [ ] -- which was  
 pretty deep -- working out obtaining the equipment that would be needed,  
 because it was supposed to represent initially a sophisticated threat --  
 that is why I was over there so long working in the [ ]

25X1A

25X1

In other words I lived with it day after day after day. Finally I went  
 over, as I have indicated, and [ ]

25X1A

and gave him the go ahead [ ] And from there we went on to

25X1A

MR. FISHER: Of course you've gotten credit for the time  
 overseas. Again it was the administrative aspect of getting a man over-  
 seas under cover that you were-- Administrative and technical in  
 terms of the equipment --

25X1A

[ ] Administrative, technical, and the  
 expertise. It's hard to describe. Actually to me, and I'm sure it is to  
 you fellows, hard to describe where is or what is say the support of the  
 DD/P - you know? Now when I'm a regular administrator sitting  
 back and giving orders and doing the normal administrative things, no  
 question, I'm an administrator. But when I'm head over heels involved  
 in the case, and then, say, in this particular instance, not only this but  
 the whole [ ] - trying to establish something that is going to  
 provide sufficient [ ] To me there is a distinction.

25X1A

25X1A

MR. FISHER: No question, it is the support of covert  
 operations, but that is really everybody in the DD/P.

Well, and as you are saying, it was a successful  
 operation in that the man over there did discover [ ]

25X1A

[ ]  
 [ ] Because from there I was of course  
 involved in determining what had happened - this and that.

MR. FISHER: Incidentally, we might as well ask now,

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other than on your overseas tours have you been under any cover?

25X1A

[ ] Yes, I was for I'm not just sure how long, initially when I came with the Agency. I came in first with IOS and I was with them for several months, at which time I was under cover --

MR. FISHER: But by and large since 1959 you have been just plain CIA, right?

25X1A

[ ] Other than when I was overseas, yes.

MR. FISHER: You speak of extensive liaison with [ ]

25X6

25X6

[ ] counterparts --

25X1A

[ ] And [ ] were in there, too.

25X6

MR. FISHER: Again, I can agree with it, but we have never given domestic qualifying service for liaison with counterparts. When you went overseas, again you got the credit for it.

Now you speak of two other assignments. In 1962 or 1963 - you indicated you weren't sure which - you were assigned on a part-time basis for approximately one year to a project charged with determining a means of [ ], and that you made trips out to the [ ] and so on. What is the basis here? Did you feel it was hazardous?

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

[ ] Well, as I started off there, it may or may not be considered qualifying. Certainly it was unique. Certainly it was unique. And here again if you want to say hazardous-- I guess the only [ ] hazard part came when I was [ ].

25X1A

MR. FISHER: But you were there as an Agency representative, no question about that.

25X1A

[ ] That is right.

MR. FISHER: Okay. Then you were assigned on practically a full-time basis as [ ] the principal Agency representative on this Committee to check into the technical and physical security of the

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MR. FISHER: And somebody else recruited her.

Well, now, you are sort of leaving it to Osborn, I suppose, to talk to the "number of sensitive operations of direct interest to the Director"?

[ ] Well, yes, as much as he would like.

25X1A

I can tell you basically that there were a considerable number and they were very extensive. And here again I wasn't out doing it, but I handled them on a 24 hour basis, believe me!

MR. FISHER: Well, I'm sure you know, Art, if you cant tell enough about that, that you always have the opportunity of going to the Director and saying: "Mr. Helms, you know what I was doing -- I can't tell the Board all about it." And then if Mr. Helms wants to wave the magic wand-- That hasn't happened very often but he has done it on one or two occasions.

25X1A

[ ] I realize that -- and, believe me, I'd be glad to tell you, except I can't.

Here again I think all I can say is, these things I'm talking about, yes, I was a supervisor-- In fact, I've been a chief of something or other since 1954. But here again I think definitely there is a distinction between what you do as a supervisor and what you do over and above your supervisory responsibility.

MR. FISHER: I can only repeat-- And I know it's hard-- But the Board has played around with these questions for a long time, so it's fairly easy for us to grasp. We are still ultimately looking for the practice of stringent tradecraft to protect your cover. Not how sensitive it is, not how expertly it was handled, not how much it was in support of clandestine operations. It's a very personal involvement that made life pretty complicated. As a matter of fact very few people under official cover have gotten domestic qualifying service. Usually [ ] it's somebody

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outside the Headquarters Building [ ] As I see it, 25X1C  
 during this entire period you were overt CIA. 25X1A

[ ] What about this uniqueness of the  
 assignment? In other words, I point out there, for what you think it's  
 worth, that sure, I could probably go out and get a job as a security officer,  
 but I don't think I could get a job paying the money or involving the respon-  
 sibility that I could if I was able to tell what I've done, what my qualifications  
 are.

MR. FISHER: Again, we think - and so far the Director  
 has supported us - that the man leaving here can say: "I worked for CIA  
 for 20 years and I became a senior officer in the Office of Security, with a  
 wide variety of responsibilities" -- and we can write a pretty good resume'  
 of Agency employment. Obviously it doesn't get down into specifics, but  
 that isn't going to hurt you terribly in terms of your getting a job. As a  
 matter of fact, as you probably know, the Security people have been doing  
 better than anybody else in getting connections.

Jay, did you have any questions?

[ ] No. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Jack? 25X1A

[ ] No. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Gordon? 25X1A

[ ] No. 25X1A

[ ] I had one concerning two of your major  
 blocks of time here, Art, that concerned that period 1959 to 1965 when  
 you say that you would estimate a minimum of 16 months of qualified  
 time. I wanted to know whether that would be your summation of the time  
 when you were actually out in the field, so to speak, helping audio teams  
 or whatever you were doing. 25X1A

[ ] Let me say that this is an estimate of

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what I consider was over and above supervisory. After all, I was Chief, Technical Division, something like five and a half years. So it's an estimate but it is an estimate of what I did over and above what I normally did as a supervisor.

25X1A [ ]: And that would be true of the 14 months or so that you estimate from 1969 to present--

25X1A [ ] Right.  
This would be the extraordinary duties, in your opinion, that go beyond what you would normally--

25X1A [ ] Right.

MR. FISHER: I think Art's claiming uniqueness and closeness to the operation rather than personal involvement in it, however. I think he has indicated that - "No, I wasn't the guy out there" --

25X1A [ ] No, I wasn't the guy out on the street.

25X1 I [ ] What I am in effect alleging - and perhaps it is that - the uniqueness - is the fact that I handled these - I can only go back and say I handled these as a case officer would handle an operation overseas, and not as an overall supervisor.

MR. FISHER: [ ], have you any questions?

25X1A

25X1A [ ]: I have one problem and that is, some areas which you feel you can't discuss, do you think Osborn is going to discuss them?

25X1A [ ]: I don't think he's going to say what they are, no.

25X1A [ ] What I'm worried about, are we now operating under a system where you might get hurt - you might not get into the CIARDS because Security won't let you talk?

MR. FISHER: This is as far as we go and then I'll alert the Director that there is a period of time here that he feels is qualifying

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and that only the Director (Mr. Helms) would know about it. I think we will know better after we talk to Mr. Osborn--

25X1A [ ] I will say here again, on these things I'm talking about here I wasn't the guy out there on the street but I was running these things 24 hours a day, and weekends --

MR. FISHER: The Director was looking to you to see that these things got done --

25X1A [ ] That it got done without a flap.

MR. FISHER: Okay, Art. Fine. Thank you.

25X1A

. . . [ ] withdrew from the meeting at this point . . .

25X1

25X1A [ ] He was on a team that made a review of the security of the [ ]

MR. FISHER: You could say that everything he did was really overt --

25X1A [ ] Yes, as overt as anything could be.

MR. FISHER: And Art knows it. I think he was pretty depressed here. I think he was smart enough to know he wasn't building up the greatest case in the world. He was honest enough to say even on those things for the Director he didn't do it himself. [ ]

25X1A

[ ] was the case officer <sup>in the Proprietary</sup> and even Dick was only arguing for his people who were out doing it.

25X1A

25X1A [ ] I wonder if Art --

MR. FISHER: Art was overt CIA all the way.

. . . Mr. Howard Osborn, Director of Security, joined the meeting at this point, at the invitation of the Board . . .

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MR. FISHER: We just had a session with Art, and Art has been very honest-- And I don't think he has helped himself very much, judging by the reaction of the Board, but Art has been honest enough to say that he had been the supervisor of all of these things. He is mentioning things like [ ] and [ ] but he admits that he didn't do these things himself, that he was supervising the people that did it. He hasn't even been under official cover. He was an overt CIA employee. So he went out on a [ ] [ ] as a CIA representative, so he was involved in the security of the [ ] as a CIA representative. I feel like a broken record when I keep saying this to all of these people, that it could have been the greatest job in the world that you did, and the most sensitive, but we are addressing ourselves to qualifying service - which is: was it hazardous, and did it take stringent security tradecraft to protect your personal cover? Well, Art was never under cover and he never really got out in the streets doing these things.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

All I want to get down to, so we don't even waste your time, is his indication that maybe he did something for the Director, which Art doesn't feel at liberty to discuss but that you would be glad to verify. Now he says you would verify his direct participation in these operations but he just made the point with us again - "Even for the Director (Mr. Helms) - he sort of held me responsible for some of these, but I didn't do it myself - somebody else was doing whatever was involved."

Now can you clarify this in any way? Is there anything he did that--

MR. OSBORN: Well, the things that he did were at the direct instruction of the Director. In terms of sensitivity, neither Mr. Colby nor Mr. Coffey knew anything about it. We currently have an IG team in the Office of Security, and I checked with the Director what he wanted



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me to exclude. Last year these activities absorbed some 80,000 man-hours of our time, and the Director said he doesn't want any part of it - or any of it discussed with the IG -- just to give you an idea of its sensitivity.

MR. FISHER: We are not asking you to tell us something so hot and sensitive that even Mr. Colby--

MR. OSBORN: There's no point in both of us not sleeping nights.

MR. FISHER: Again, in relation to [ ] as an individual, in terms of qualifying service he needs 27 months. I think I speak for this group in saying we don't see it. Would you like to talk to the Director about [ ] and get from him for me a statement that he thinks [ ] has done 27 months worth of qualifying service? 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A

MR. OSBORN: I can't, really, because the Director leaves tomorrow morning and won't be back until the 4th of January.

MR. FISHER: Well, I'm in no hurry, if Art is not.

MR. OSBORN: Art wants to get out in December. If he doesn't get out in December under the CIARDS he may want to consider discontinued service -- which is all over as of 31 December.

Now, in these activities - first of all we had to develop a capability that the Agency had never had before -- which we have done in a period of three years. Secondly, we have had to devise techniques never devised before, and Art devised them not in a supervisory sense but in the sense of creating something --

MR. FISHER: Okay, that is great, but he sat at a desk here in Langley --

MR. OSBORN: No, not all of it. He was out in the [ ]

[ ] And he did not supervise them as Deputy Director, Security, for Investigations and Operational Support, he supervised them as a case officer does, working out of the [ ] and 25X1A 25X1A

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[ ] I grant you, he wasn't out on the street, 25X1A  
but to my mind it's a little different.

But what I would like to ask you, Harry, so I won't waste your time by sending any more of these up, is how much credence does the Board put on what you can tell the prospective employer about what you can do. And don't give me all that crap that you tell them you're a Security officer, because that means nothing any more - anymore than if you tell them you're a personnel officer or you're a lawyer. They say - "What kind of law? what kind of a Personnel Officer are you? what do you specialize in?"

MR. FISHER: You don't have to say very much.

MR. OSBORN: You made a point of that with [ ] 25X1A  
And I don't buy it. This is a highly specialized field and it's getting more specialized --

MR. FISHER: But the sorts of things that [ ] did 25X1A  
are not going to be all that saleable on the outside. He can say: I became an Assistant Director of Security for the CIA and then in that capacity I know about inspections, I know about technical security, I served

25X1A to protect the security of the [ ] and I was involved in [ ] 25X1A

25X1A [ ] etc. He can put a lot of these things he did overtly - and we could help him come up with words that would convey most of the talents that he has.

I'm sorry, but our experience is that the Security people are doing better at getting jobs than anybody else. And we've been through this with engineers who have been [ ] 25X1C

25X1C [ ] What difference does it make what kind of signal he was analyzing, if he can say: I can analyze a sophisticated signal and break it down into its simplest components. That conveys a message, no matter what the signal is.

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So, again, I really don't think he would be terribly inhibited. The chances are he has a job all lined up anyway.

MR. OSBORN: No, he doesn't. But what is the difference between Art and [ ] What did he do --

25X1A

MR. FISHER: He was a [ ] type --

25X1A

MR. OSBORN: Is it the fact that he was out on the street

25X1A

[ ]

MR. FISHER: He didn't just say [ ] He spoke

25X1A

of no cover --

25X1A

[ ] He was the one that had his own network

with the [ ] etc.

25X1A

MR. FISHER: If we err, it's erring on the side of trying to give a guy something. But he indicated that he knew guys from the old

[ ]

25X1C

and so on. It sounded to us like a

fairly classical covert operation. Now maybe he snowed us --

MR. OSBORN: Well, I don't think he did.

MR. FISHER: But if a fellow just sits here in Langley as an overt CIA employee-- And I'm not trying to downgrade in any respect the initiative and the ingenuity that Art showed in developing these techniques, but that isn't what we are paying off on --

MR. OSBORN: Well, I guess the only thing open to him is discontinued service retirement. So be it.

MR. FISHER: At least that is what we are going to recommend -- I think I speak for the Board here, because we discussed it a little bit after Art left. It just isn't there. As I said to Art, we considered the Director's case (the case of Mr. Helms), and he is not in the CIARDS. Now he is ultimately responsible for all of these things,

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so if you carried that on out-- And Art is making much of the fact that - "I don't want it as a supervisor but as a case officer." We have a lot of DD/P case officers who are really running operations right out of here, but we don't give them credit for that. Maybe it isn't completely consistent -- if he did the same thing overseas, he would get it.

Now I don't know where we are going down the line on the surplus -- after you get another cut whether there will be another possibility down the line that you will get involved in a surplus action. And I hate to put Art into the position of - "I have to do something in seven or eight days." Art doesn't lose a whole lot -- he only loses the three and three-quarters percent. And I'm not saying that that is insignificant. But Art is not under age 55, so he doesn't have to take a reduced annuity under the Civil Service. I don't know what his annuity would be, but let's say it's \$16,000 - or whatever, so we're talking about maybe \$650.00 a year - which is not a life or death matter if he has really made up his mind to go.

[ ] It's about 45%, probably, under Civil Service. 25X1A

[ ] But he also loses the pay raise and the higher insurance by leaving by 31 December. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Like everyone else, we've said we will let them go to January 8th. So he doesn't get cheated out of that.

[ ] He would be discontinued service. 25X1A  
[ ] You would have to treat him as a surplus case.

MR. OSBORN: Well, that is a decision he will have to make.

MR. FISHER: But unless he feels that the Director might overturn this, I can tell you I don't think anyone else will -- not on the facts of this case -- it's a pretty weak case, really.

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[ ] This stuff he has been doing for the  
Director has been going on for three years? 25X1A

MR. OSBORN: Yes. 25X1A

[ ] And that is where he was creative, etc. ?

MR. OSBORN: Yes. 25X1A

[ ] Can't you talk to the Director today?  
Can't you reach him today?

MR. OSBORN: I don't like to push him right now on this.  
As a matter of fact, my counsel to Art is not to appeal it -- and I'm not  
going to send any more up like this again.

MR. FISHER: Well, read them carefully, Oz.

MR. OSBORN: I do.

MR. FISHER: Some of them are good, some are not.

. . . . Mr. Osborn withdrew from the meeting at  
this point . . . .

MR. FISHER: Oz is like [ ] - They feel all  
the Security officers-- 25X1A

[ ] Oz is upset. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: I hate to do it to him -- 25X1A

[ ] I didn't have enough nerve to ask him why  
does Art want to retire. He's a Grade 16, Deputy Director of Security.  
It's not the business of this Board but I'm real curious why are we getting  
rid of this guy? It's not as if he is really retiring.

MR. FISHER: The truth is Security is top heavy -- they've  
got more people than they need up there. But that is not our problem  
right now.

[ ] But Art is one of their good ones. 25X1A

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MR. FISHER: Certainly Oz seems to think so. Although he's not fighting to keep Art on --

[ ]: No, and that's what is incongruous. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Well, gentlemen, we've discussed this one at some length. Is somebody ready to make a motion?

[ ] I move it not be approved. 25X1A

[ ] Second.

. . . This motion was then unanimously carried . . .

25X1A

[ ]: I think it might be worthwhile, Harry, to kind of look at all of the Office of Security cases. I'm also thinking of [ ] coming up now. But I hope we have been consistent enough so that we can argue our points of view. 25X1A

[ ] Most of those we have approved have been from the [ ] 25X1A

MR. FISHER: Oh I'm not for a minute thinking we haven't probably made a mistake, but I think if we made a mistake it has been on giving domestic qualifying service -- 25X1A

[ ]: That's it, and then that is the kind of precedent that hurts you in the minds of these people who are turned down later.

MR. FISHER: I was delighted when the Director said: You are going to make a mistake here and there, but if you're a bunch of honest guys trying to call them as you see them, by and large you will do all right. Now I'll admit that maybe it's the way the guy is presenting it that it gets through and there might be somebody else sitting here and not presenting his case as well as he should-- But we haven't given it to anybody at Headquarters -- they've been the ones at the [ ] 25X1A

25X1

[ ] - the fellows out under little or no cover working strictly in support of the Clandestine Service.

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[ ] But if anybody submits one, I hope 25X1A  
Mr. Osborn doesn't stop it from coming to this Board.

MR. FISHER: Oh no, he won't -- that was just a momentary  
pique, I think, saying he's not going to send any more up here. 25X1A

[ ] If we were to allow this one to qualify then  
I think it would open the door very wide in the DD/P.

MR. FISHER: Of course it would.  
I honestly don't have any trouble turning this one  
down. I really don't see it as qualifying. 25X1A

[ ] Harry, I wonder if you could talk to the  
Director today about [ ] Because Osborn says he isn't going to. 25X1A  
And maybe the Director can't be reached today--

MR. FISHER: I'm not going to bother the Director about  
this one on his last day before taking leave. Because I don't really think  
that even Art thinks it's good. He's saying, "I didn't do it directly--" 25X1A

[ ] I think he was quick to make that point - 25X1A  
"And even there, I didn't do it." And then we all know [ ]  
went to the Director -- and although Wes was in a different type of security,  
it was almost the same type of thing - in effect working for the Director --  
and the Director turned him down.

MR. FISHER: It takes a lot to get the message through to 25X1A  
Oz. Because I think [ ] in many ways did more than [ ], and 25X1A  
if we ever okayed [ ] then people would say: "What's the difference? - 25X1A  
why not [ ] We turned ~~Benson Tweedy down~~ and [ ] down.  
~~He~~ was Deputy Director of SB for awhile and he, too, felt that because 25X1A  
people under him were engaged in a lot of these things that he should get  
qualifying service too. 25X1A

[ ] We have three requests for voluntary re- 25X1A  
tirement: [ ], 8 January; [ ] 12 February; 25X1A

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[ ] 12 May. And then three involuntaries: [ ]  
[ ] 31 December; [ ] 29 December; and  
[ ] 29 December.

25X1A  
25X1A  
25X1A  
25X1A  
25X1A

. . . Motion was then made and passed that the  
above requests be approved . . .

MR. FISHER: Next we have [ ]

25X1A

. . . [ ] joined the meeting at this  
point to testify in his own behalf . . .

25X1A

MR. FISHER: [ ] let me say a few words  
first, although you and I have talked a bit, and let me repeat a couple of  
things that I was saying to [ ] too.

25X1A

25X1A

Art mentioned a lot of sensitive operations that he  
has been involved in, albeit in the supervisory relationship. And we  
always sound like we're denigrating the work he did -- but we're not.  
In other words, people could be doing very important, very sensitive work,  
but ultimately this Board has thus far built up its case history on the very  
personal relationship of the individual - was it hazardous and did he  
really have to practice stringent tradecraft to protect his personal cover.  
And those are the guidelines we will use in listening to you.

Now, while I'm sure you don't share this, in our  
first review of your case and based on what you were doing, it didn't look  
good enough to even have you come in -- which we normally do. Now  
obviously since then we have recognized that you still have problems with  
our finding, and therefore I certainly feel you are entitled to tell this group  
what it is about your service that you feel is qualifying.

I don't want to restrict you but I wish you would  
limit it to that type of relationship - whether it was qualifying or not. If

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you want to challenge the whole concept, then I think that would be part of your appeal. Because this Board has a charter to implement the CIA Retirement System the way it has been written.

So, with that, whether you want to take it from there--  
Would you like to make a statement or would you like me to ask some questions?

[ ] I'd like to first distribute a draft, if I 25X1A  
may, a brief outline form, and talk to that. And then I'd be perfectly willing to answer any questions as I go along, or later.

Gentlemen, I'm happy to have the opportunity to talk before the Board. I don't plan to take a lot of your time. I think perhaps you have my original application, or at least a digest of it, and if you have that convenient, I'd like to use this draft in conjunction with that.

First of all, so as not to take up too much of your time, I think perhaps you will agree - or perhaps you won't, you will tell me that my total PCS and TDY time overseas would count as qualifying service -- and I've indicated that here as 44 months and 27 days.

[ ] We have down here more than that. 25X1A

MR. FISHER: We have 46 months and 15 days -- so actually we have given you more than you have asked for. You earned it -- you had that much.

[ ] No, I think mine is an accurate count. 25X1A

Well, perhaps you have done this -- and this is what I did -- I calculate that any time you take a TDY, at least in my own experience you don't go out cold and you don't come back and forget about the whole thing. You go through a good deal of preparation, and planning, and briefing, and discussing and outlining what your goals are, and when you come back you write reports and brief people when you decide what it was that you saw out there you thought was important to record for the record.

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[ ] or whatever. I have claimed 25X1A  
there six months under the best case, or if you're counting sort of day  
by day I've counted two and a half months as qualifying time.

I then turn to my time in what is known as OSA.  
At that time it was DPD of the DD/P. I have listed 12 months for the  
total time because I felt that is the 12 months which count. I dnn't want  
to again go into what I went into at fairly great length in my initial application,  
but that was a time when this was clearly a foreign operation. There was no  
doubt about it, U-2's were flying over China and Cuba for an extended period  
of time. While this doesn't necessarily count for much, there's an old  
saying, with that and 15 cents you have a cup of coffee. At that time I  
was in this building seven days a week and sometimes twice on those days,  
and answering phone calls at all hours of the day and night. Frankly it  
was very physically wearing and taxing. I don't know that I would like  
to go through that again. But I did it. If you would call that in support of  
foreign operations-- I'd say it would have to be, but then I would have  
to concede that I did not exercise tradecraft during this time except during  
those trips overseas.

MR. FISHER: I was going to make the point that before we  
can even consider anything it has to be in support of clandestine operations,  
but that that in itself is not qualifying. We then go to the nature of your  
personal involvement. Again, I know the job, and I know the officers and  
people who worked around the clock every time these things were in the air.  
So far we don't feel it involved tradecraft. But I think I know the job -  
I think all of us know the job of the security officer working out of  
headquarters on that operation. And you have nothing special to add to  
that, right? in terms of unique tradecraft that you were practicing?

25X1A

[ ] I'd have to concede except for those points  
in time in the United States when I was directly in touch [ ]

25X1A

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MR. FISHER: Well, the overseas you have already gotten credit for.

25X1A

[ ] There were a few TDY's in the country but if I added up the days there, there wouldn't be (much).

25X1 I would also - and I hope you don't consider this simply flimsy, because I think it's rather important. There's a section a, I believe, [ ] and it talks about hazardous duty. I personally feel it got to be rather hazardous to the health of the individual to work seven days a week, to get up every second hour during the night to answer the telephone, with calls about couriers being stuck here or there, or problems of one sort or another. But I don't feel conscience-stricken in claiming it.

Then if you turn to line 5, I have claimed time when I was security officer in NE Division. Perhaps you have had other people who have been those officers, and I'm sure many of the duties I had were similar to many others had. I feel the whole time ought to be counted because it was clearly in support of foreign operations. I exercised trade-craft on and off - not every day but very frequently, and on very many occasions, and for very many different things.

MR. FISHER: I'd like to stop you there for a second. First of all, during this period what cover were you under?

[ ] During this time I was under official cover - [ ]

25X1A

25X1A

MR. FISHER: Can you give us some examples of how you-- To begin with, I assume you had an office here in this building.

25X1A

[ ] Yes.

MR. FISHER: Can you give us a couple of for instances of how you practiced tradecraft in terms of-- And I'm talking about stringent tradecraft to protect your personal cover.

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[ ] If I could talk about the second case I  
dealt with specifically, and that is-- 25X1A

MR. FISHER: This is all a break-out under 5? 25X1A

[ ] Yes.

Well, I can speak to each of them individually,  
because some of them are rather similar. There was one particular



25X1A

MR. FISHER: Did you feel you were with him to protect  
him or to be sure that he didn't do something that he ought not do --

[ ] I felt I was with him to protect him,  
to prevent him - perhaps not physically restraining him but to prevent  
him from doing anything that was inimical to the interest of the United

States, or really to prevent his being in touch with any [ ]  
[ ] 25X1A  
25X1A

MR. FISHER: What were the living arrangements?

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a DD/P case officer in that area of the world, so there was no real reason why I couldn't do it. So for that time I calculated 30 days.

25X1A

[redacted] And these were trips out of town to see her, or something of that sort?

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] Yes, trips out of town to [redacted] or to [redacted] -- or sometimes her coming to this area -- but at all

25X1A

times my [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] Essentially you were just reporting on how she was doing --

25X1A

[redacted] Well, as [redacted] indicates in a memo attached to this, I was her case officer for 27 months.

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] She was a [redacted] type?

25X1A

[redacted] Yes.

MR. FISHER: You're saying 30 days. You don't have that here. You have one here for six weeks. I am now going by your sheet. Am I missing it?

25X1A

[redacted] No. When I say 30 days, I literally went through it and I tried to see how many days, because it would be like two or three days at a time. It was spread out. I saw her at least quarterly. So when I finally boiled it down, I called it 30 days. So doing it that way, it comes out --

Then I sort of summarized and bundled together various other cases. There were at least three different occasions when

25X1A

[redacted] and take them around to show them the sights in the city or answer some of their questions."

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calculating this on a very narrow basis I would say that seven months would be the time which I would call qualifying for this period. Adding up the various weeks, or giving it a broader scope or broader horizon I say it ought to be four years and two months, because there was no telling when, during this whole tenure in NE Division, when I would have to act using tradecraft, act in assisting operations, act in a way that could be hazardous to my own well being -- and I was quite prepared to do it, and I did it, and I think I did it to the best of my ability. But that really isn't the point. The point I am trying to make, I feel the whole time ought to count, but I feel at the very least seven months of that time ought to count as qualifying time.

MR. FISHER: Well, we won't quibble right now. We will have to discuss it. I think some of it is clearly good, and some of it in my opinion is clearly not. But let's go on, because the meat of it is really this DDS&T [ ] office time.

25X1A

25X1A

[ ] Then line 6. I returned to the DD/S and the office where I was chief of that office for a period of time. I mentioned that while in the assignment I was required or obliged - or it

25X1C

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Another thing - and you can't say typical, because this happens occasionally -- Mr. Helms came out to visit us in June 1970, and he indicated or my office in Washington indicated that he wanted to visit several [ ] and in order to use his time in the best or most efficient way, because [ ] is so sprawling, he would like to travel by air. So I did a number of dry runs, if you will, myself, in

25X1C

25X1A

25X1

[ ]  
to that area. I'll admit Mr. Helms put himself in a security risk but I don't think that detracts from the fact that I shared that risk with him - had it myself.

25X1C

[ ]  
[ ]  
realize other people do it and I think you should be equally considerate of them when it's consistently of long duration, when it's frequent --

MR. FISHER: We are concerned about negated insurance, I certainly would agree with you there.

25X1C

[ ] And then, gentlemen, I would like to withdraw my request for the computation of headquarters time. In re-thinking it I can't really see that it falls within the Regulations.

So therefore when I calculated-- And I hope my arithmetic is right. I think my qualifying time under the best circumstances, if you accept all of the time, I'm claiming eleven years. And I counted under the worst case that I can calculate, based on my reading of the

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Regulation, is six years and two months -- which would seem to take me beyond the 60 months that I need for CIARDS.

25X1A

[ ] One thing you didn't go into. Under this [ ] office you have 70% of work in direct support of overseas operations, and I think we need a little more information on that.

25X1A

MR. FISHER: Even assuming that we said yes to when you [ ] that that was hazardous, then you go on and say 70%, and that's what I have trouble with.

25X1C

25X1C



MR. FISHER: Again, Jack - and I know I have repeated this a couple of times, but the support of foreign operations by itself is not

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25X1C

25X1A

[redacted] And these many flights I mentioned, and support in accompanying foreign participants in this IDEALIST --

25X1A

MR. FISHER: But they were official liaison participants--

[redacted] Official liaison, probably, for the most part. And I realize I had made one other point in my initial application, which I suppose is moot and I know you can't rule on, and that is my original incorporation in the Career Staff of CIA. I hope of course I won't be taking it up because I hope I won't be making an appeal.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] On the [redacted] that was [redacted]  
Yes, official [redacted] at that time.

25X1A

25X1A

MR. FISHER: [redacted] do you have any questions?

[redacted] No, I think he has covered his case very well.

MR. FISHER: He has already answered all these questions

I was going to ask him.

Did you have any questions, Jack? or Jay?

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] No.

MR. FISHER: Thank you very much, [redacted].

25X1A

. . . [redacted] withdrew from the meeting at this point . . .

MR. FISHER: Well, I must say he handled himself very nicely. Again, for the Board, with me he did bring up things like he feels, almost like Marchetti, that the Agency has breached its contract with him, that when he signed up for the Career Service he offered to give his all for the Agency and the Agency offered to provide to him these benefits,

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one of which he considers membership in the CIA System. I tried to say that membership in the CIARDS is a matter of statute and requires qualifying service, and it does not go to everybody. He still isn't quite convinced that that is true.

[ ] But it doesn't automatically imply - to 25X1A  
me, anyway - that you are authorized to retire at age 46. It's a career benefit, to me, and a career means going to more than age 46.

MR. FISHER: He also almost separately said that he would really challenge the Director's final authority in terms of who should be in the System. And I said I thought the statute is relatively clear on that, and that one man had seen fit -- and this was the wrong thing to say -- had seen fit to get in touch with a lawyer. I had in mind [ ] 25X1A  
And [ ] said - "Well, if I was going to do it I wouldn't hire a Wall 25X1A  
Street lawyer." And then he immediately said, "I am not threatening -- I have no intention of going to court on this." He did ask for a transcript of the Board meeting -- which we explained to him we couldn't give out, really, that it would be very inhibiting to the Board to have a full discussion if we turned this transcript over to the people involved -- and the OGC I think supported us on that. An indication of what if any of the service claimed as qualifying was accepted-- Although frankly we had such a perfunctory review of his case that it would have been a little difficult -- 25X1A

[ ] But it's easier now.

MR. FISHER: I think it's a lot easier to decide that now, and I think we have to address ourselves to: (Reading from memo from [ ] 25X1A  
[ ] "All instruction and guidance from higher authority in CIA concerning the selection of personnel for participation in CIARDS from the time of passage of the CIA Retirement Act and its implementation up to the present time." And I explained to him that other than the letter

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from Colonel White which opened things up in 1969 -- and which we would be happy to show him -- there had been no particular guidance other than oral presentations by the Director in which he said he thought by and large the Board was doing things properly, and the guidelines or definitions used by the Retirement Board to determine qualifying service are those which occur [ ] And [ ] has been advised that that is it. They are broad, they are subjective -- we are doing the best we can with them. And then he was hitting the 1969 decision - that is, what is the criteria currently and what was different criteria which might have been used in the past -- he meant the June 30, 1969 memo. Again, he has been a gentleman about it but he just doesn't accept that you can change your mind from time to time.

[ ] I think we have to remember if he does stay around he will probably be back in here when he thinks he has added a little more time -- so our record had better be fairly clear on that.

MR. FISHER: Whether we use his figure that he requires 17 more months-- He's saying 15 more months, I guess, and we're really saying 46 and a half months with --

[ ] With 13 and a half to go.

MR. FISHER: Yes, with 13 and a half to go.

Now I don't know how precise we've been - or have to be. The planning and the preparation and doing reports after you get back to your desk, we just never have considered, nor do we think we should start doing it.

I don't have too much problem with saying the three weeks of close [ ] is okay. Nor that the two weeks of [ ] - It might be questionable, but we could give him the benefit of the doubt if he's [ ] etc.

The three weeks using the [ ]

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I don't see as qualifying at all. I think it was just fairly routine investigative work.

[ ] Yes.

25X1A

MR. FISHER: The DPD time, I think even he under his worst case assumes nothing, and I'm inclined to agree with him.

The NE Division time, assuming that he has tried to give us everything that he knows, I certainly could go along with the five weeks.

[ ] That is the one where he said he was known as CIA [ ]

25X1A  
25X1A

[ ] The next one is with the gal?

25X1A

MR. FISHER: The man from [ ]

25X1A

[ ] But [ ] was known to the man.

25X1A

MR. FISHER: He was the one he stayed with, using

25X1A

[ ] to sort of keep him out of trouble and see that he didn't in a sense [ ]

You know, I can lean and say even that certainly required a degree of tradecraft. I could even lean on the woman without quibbling too much.

[ ] around of course is nothing. I think we have been through that one before.

25X1A

Locating and appraising safe houses in [ ]

25X1A

[ ] -- I don't think we have ever considered that qualifying.

25X1A

Secret Service duty we have not considered -- and protecting foreign nationals we have not given it on.

So we come down really to the 19 months as being the guts of it. Because up to this point we're talking about maybe 16 weeks - or less than three months. So we're still looking for ten months. I don't even feel that we have to quibble about

the [ ] -- we certainly have never given that as hazardous duty. I'd like to think the [ ]

25X1C

25X1C

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maintenance programs are just as good as the civilian-- The Director

25X1

25X1C

25X1

So how we can find ten months of this

I just don't see it. Now does anybody feel that it is there?

No, I don't.

25X1A

I can get him to four months and a week--

Yes, four months and a week.

And that's it! I can get him back down

to about nine months required, but that is as far as I can get.

MR. FISHER: We're not talking as much about it as we might because we've been all through it a couple of times -- and I'd like to think we have all done our homework.

There are no grounds for it.

25X1A

MR. FISHER: There is really no new information in this piece of paper. I just can't see it. Well, I'm quite sure he will appeal.

Okay, I'm ready for a motion, I believe.

Move that it be disallowed.

25X1A

Second.

. . . This motion was then unanimously carried . . .

MR. FISHER: Next, The first letter on really did her no great service because it left us really basing it pretty much on compassion -- and the fact that these two are left with a \$17,000 income and a \$3600 a year mortgage, really doesn't tell us very much about the hardship of it. On the other hand, the latest memo does address itself to the fact that she is a GS-6 doing a fine job. And I would have to admit as Director of Personnel that we

25X1A

25X1A

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continue to have a difficult time hiring people at this level. I would be strongly motivated in this case to go along with the one year extension request for this GS-6 woman based really on operational requirements and the difficulty to replace her. I don't have too much trouble with it.

. . . Motion was then made and passed that Mrs.

be given a one year extension . . .

25X1A

. . . The meeting adjourned at 3:45 p.m. . . .

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